The possibility of ideological bias in structural macroeconomic models by Saint-Paul, Gilles
The possibility of ideological bias in
structural macroeconomic models
Gilles Saint-Paul
Toulouse school of economics
June 8, 2011
1 Introduction
Can ideological bias pervade economic modelling, and yet act in such a way
that prevailing models remain consistent with the data? Such biases may
explain ongoing controversies among macroeconomists about key structural
parameters, in particular (i) the size of the Keynesian multiplier, (ii) the
slope of the aggregate supply curve, and (iii) the nature of the shocks that
drive business cycles.
These controversies are well known to our profession. Here is an ex-
cerpt from a web reading list (http://homepage3.nifty.com/ronten/crisis-
readings.htm) about the nancial crisis:
The Spending Multiplier Debate
Positive: Romer and Bernstein: The Job Impact of the Ameri-
can Recovery and Reinvestment Plan; Krugman: The Conscience
of a Liberal; Getting scal; War and Non-Remembrance; Dont
know much about history; Paul Krugman recommends us to learn
more from Japans experiences; Adam P. Posen (1998) Fiscal
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Policy Works When It Is Tried in Restoring Japans Economic
Growth.
Skeptical: Mankiw: Fiscal Policy Puzzles; *Spending and Tax
Multipliers, How Not to Stimulate the Economy; John Taylor:
Why Permanent Tax Cuts Are the Best Stimulus; Cogan, Cwik,
Taylor and Wieland (2009): New Keynesian versus Old Key-
nesian Government Spending Multipliers; Smets-Wouters (2003)
Model; Hall and Woodford: Measuring the E¤ect of Infrastruc-
ture Spending on GDP with a comment by Robert Gordon.
Now here are some excerpts from the wikipedia articles about some of
the above authors:
Romer: "Christina Romer (née Duckworth; born December
25, 1958) is the Class of 1957 Gar¤ B. Wilson Professor of Eco-
nomics at the University of California, Berkeley and the out-going
Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers in the Obama admin-
istration. She resigned from her role on the Council of Economic
Advisers on September 3, 2010. After her nomination and be-
fore the Obama administration took o¢ ce, Romer worked with
economist Jared Bernstein to co-author the administrations plan
recovery from the 2008 recession. In a January 2009 video pre-
sentation, she discussed details of the job creation package that
the Obama administration submitted to Congress."
Krugman: "In a review for The New York Times, Pulitzer
prize-winning historian David M. Kennedy stated, "Like the rants
of Rush Limbaugh or the lms of Michael Moore, Krugmans
shrill polemic may hearten the faithful, but it will do little to
persuade the unconvinced"
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Mankiw: "He returned to politics when he was appointed
by President George W. Bush as Chairman of the Council of
Economic Advisors in May 2003."
Taylor: "He has been active in public policy, serving as the
Under Secretary of the Treasury for International A¤airs during
the rst term of the George W. Bush Administration"
These quotes suggest a congruence between political preferences and
views about economic parameters.1 It is also true, historically, that left-wing
economists have leaned toward a "at" Phillips curve, while conservatives
prefer it steep or even vertical. In the eighties, when the RBC literature
was being developed, "fresh water" conservatives emphasized the quantita-
tive role of demand shocks, while "salt water" social democrats thought that
demand shocks were the driving force of economic uctuations.
This paper studies the trade-o¤s that an expert with ideological biases
faces in designing his model. As in Saint-Paul (2011), I assume the perceived
model must be autocoherent, in that its use by all agents delivers a self-
conrming equilibrium (as in Fudenberg and Levine (2003,2007) and Sargent
(2008)). The exercise is carried in the context of a simplied AS-AD model,
where in principle the expert can inuence policy by manipulating six key
parameters:
-The response of aggregate demand to government expenditure
-The response of aggregate demand to interest rates
-The response of output to actual ination in the Phillips curve
-The response of output to expected ination
-The variance of supply shocks
-The variance of demand shocks
Do we expect the economistss political preferences to inuence those
1To some extent, Fuchs et al. (1999) report similar ndings.
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parameters in the directions predicted by the above discussion? The answer is
a rough yes. For example, a larger reported Keynesian multiplier is favored by
more left-wing economists, because it induces the government to pursue more
activist policies, which they like better than conservatives. Similarly, a atter
ination output trade-o¤ will increase the perceived e¢ ciency of activist
policies, and left-wing economists will also want to favor those congurations.
But an important aspect of the analysis is that autocoherence conditions
imply constraints and trade-o¤s between parameters. For example a larger
reported Keynesian multiplier must be associated with a lower interest elas-
ticity of aggregate demand for the economistss model to match the data,
otherwise the covariance between output and an observed leading indicator
of activity will be missed. Consequently, being over-optimistic about scal
policy implies being over-pessimistic about monetary policy. Similarly, the
economist must often run against his preferences for the short-term Phillips
curve or the relative variance of supply shocks for the autocoherence con-
straints to be met.
Furthermore, some parameters or some combinations of parameters must
be truthfully revealed for the expert to remain autocoherent. These are the
parameters that are "identied" from the empirical moments of the distrib-
ution of observables that the economist must match. In the simple example
below, agents base their expectations on a signal of the underlying demand
shock, and that signal is orthogonal to the supply disturbance in the Phillips
curve. This allows private agents to implicitly estimate the correct long-run
slope of the Phillips curve by using that signal as an instrument; in other
words, the long-run slope of the Phillips curve is implicitly revealed by the
equilibrium moments of the observables. As it turns out, only that long-run
slope matters for policy, and it is then impossible for economists to inuence
policy through the perceived Phillips curve parameters. I then extend the
model to allow for this possibility, by assuming that the agentssignal is pol-
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luted by the supply shock. This illustrates the tight link between parameter
identication and the scope for bias that is generated by the autocoherence
conditions.
Another insight delivered by the analysis below is the possibility of what
I label as criticality. For some parameter values of the true model, the au-
tocoherence conditions imposed on the perceived model may make it locally
impossible for the expert to inuence policy. In such a case even small devi-
ations between the experts ideological preferences and the government will
lead to large di¤erences in the reported parameter values.
2 An AS-AD model
The economy is driven by a standard AS-AD structure. Two kinds of agents
make decisions: the government and the people. The government sets govern-
ment expenditures, while the peoples decisions depend on their inationary
expectations. Both use a perceived model which will be determined by a sin-
gle self-serving economist. Therefore, we will distinguish between the correct
model (CM), and the perceived one (PM), whose parameters are denoted
with a hat.
The model consists of three equations:
y =  i+ g + u0 + v
i = p+ y
y = p  pe + v
The endogenous variables are y; output, g; public expenditure, i; the
interest rate, p, the price level, and pe; the expected price level (to make
the discussion more realistic I will interchangeably refer to p as the ination
rate). Therefore the model is closed if a rule for forming expectations and a
policy rule are added to these three structural equations.
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The economy is subjected to an aggregate demand shock u0 and an ag-
gregate supply shock v: The rst equation is an "IS" curve, the second one
can be interpreted as either an LM curve or a Taylor rule2, and the third
equation is an aggregate supply (or Phillips) curve. Note that the supply
shock also a¤ects aggregate demand. This makes it harder to identify the
true models parameters and raises the experts degrees of freedom in de-
signing his model. There is no dearth of theoretical mechanisms for supply
shocks to a¤ect aggregate demand as well; in most models greater productiv-
ity will change investment and consumption plans through its relative price
and wealth e¤ects. The coe¢ cients of the interest rate equation are assumed
to be common knowledge and normalized to one for simplicity.
I assume 0    : Roughly,  can be interpreted as the slope of the
short-run Phillips curve and   as the slope of the long-run Phillips curve.
If  = ; we have a Lucas supply curve, and there is no long-run trade-o¤
between output and ination. If  = 0; we have an old fashioned Phillips
curve which ignores expectations. The output-ination trade-o¤ is more
"favorable", the greater  and the smaller : Intuitively, we might expect
more "progressive" experts to favor models with large values of  and small
values of : The other parameters of interest are ; referred to as the "demand
Keynesian multiplier" (DKM), and ; the interest elasticity of aggregate
demand. These two parameters are nonnegative.
Eliminating interest rates, the model can be re-expressed as the following
recursive form:
y =  bpe + ag + u+ v; (1)
p =


pe   v

+
y

: (2)
2In this static model, we do not have to worry about the actual values of the coe¢ cients
of the interest rate rule. Here they are normalized tio one to save on notation.
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Here, a; b; and  are composite parameters given by
a =

 + (1 + )
;
b =

 + (1 + )
 ;
 =
 + 
 + (1 + )
 b

:
To save on notation, the aggregate demand shock is redened as u =

+(1+)
u0:
Both expectations and government policy are formed upon observing a
signal of the demand shock,
z = !u+ ";
where " is noise. I assume
(u; v; ")  N(0;
0@ 2u 0 00 2v 0
0 0 2"
1A):
Furthermore, to simplify on notation I will impose the normalization
!22u + 
2
" = 1:
After the equilibrium is realized, people observe the output level y and the
price level p: Given that the monetary policy rule is known and the interest
rate only depends on p and y, there is no additional information in observing
the interest rate.
Thus, we distinguish between two information sets: The information set
prevailing when expectations and government policy are formed, which is
given by fzg; and the information set which determines the data against
which any credible model must be validated. That information set is given
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by fy; p; zg:3 Government spending is also observed but since it will be pro-
portional to z; with a slope parameter which is common knowledge, that
knowledge is redundant.
The perceived model must satisfy the plausibility conditions that all its
parameters are nonnegative and that 0  ^  ^: Since, given the other
parameters, any plausible target value for (a^; b^; ^) that satises ^  b^
^
and
b^  ^ can be matched by an appropriate choice of (^; ^; ^); I will consider
that the theorist can directly set the three composite parameters (a^; b^; ^); and
accordingly add the inequalities ^  b^
^
and b^  ^ to the set of plausibility
conditions.
I will proceed as follows. First, I solve for the equilibrium, given the
model used by the people and the level of government spending. Second, I
derive the optimal government policy. Third, I spell out the autocoherence
conditions that the perceived model must satisfy.
3 Solution
3.1 Solving for p and y:
The rst step in solving for the equilibrium consists in computing pe: Sub-
stituting (1) into (2) we get that
p =


pe   v

  b

pe +
a

g +
u

+
v

:
People believe that the following relationship holds instead:
p =
^
^
pe   v^
^
  b^
^
pe +
a^
^
g +
u^
^
+
^v^
^
:
3Note that I require the model to match those data despite that it will be used prior
to their realization. While the model is one-shot, I want it to take into account the fact
that the peoples forecasting model will be used repeatedly and therefore must match the
data.
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Note the hats on u and v : the realization of the shocks that would be
inferred from the peoples model di¤er from the actual ones, unless the model
is correct.
To obtain pe we take expectations on both sides, using the conditional
distributions generated by the perceived model. I denote again by a hat this
expectation. We get that
pe =
1
^ + b^  ^ E^(u j z) +
a^
^ + b^  ^g: (3)
Substituting into (1), we get a reduced form equation for output
y =   b
^ + b^  ^ E^(u j z) +

a  ba^
^ + b^  ^

g + u+ v: (4)
Plugging (3) and (4) into (2), we then get
p =
  b
(^ + b^  ^)E^(u j z) +
 
a

+
a^(  b)
(^ + b^  ^)
!
g +
u

+
  1

v: (5)
3.2 Optimal government policy
As in Saint-Paul (2011), the government wants to stabilize output and gov-
ernment spending. Its objective function is
min E^(y2 + 'g2);
where ' is a parameter which captures how conservative the government
is. I could also allow for the government to stabilize prices, but since the
government can only react to demand shocks there is no supply signal at
the time of setting policy that additional objective is similar to stabilizing
output, and I ignore it for simplicity.4
4One could extend the model by assuming that a signal of the supply shock is also
observed. Responding to that signal would involve a trade-o¤ between price stability and
output stability. In this paper the focus is instead on price/output stability vs. government
expenditure stability.
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Upon realization of the signal z; the government sets g so as to minimize
E^(y2 + 'g2 j z) = E^(y2 j z) + 'g2:
I assume g is observed at the time of setting inationary expectations.
Therefore, there is no credibility problem and the government will internalize
the entire feedback e¤ect of scal stimulus on output through ination and its
monetary policy response when setting its policy5. Therefore, the rst-order
condition is
d^y
d^g
E^(y j z) + 'g = 0: (6)
The derivative d^y
d^g
is the perceived reduced form Keynesian multiplier
(RFKM), which is di¤erent from the impact multiplier (IKM), itself equal to
a and perceived as a^: Its correct value can be obtained from (4):
dy
dg
= a  ba^
^ + b^  ^ : (7)
Two aspects are noteworthy. First, the true Keynesian multiplier not
only depends on the true model but also on the perceived one. This is be-
cause part of the expansionary e¤ect of government spending is dissipated
by greater inationary expectations, which in turn generate greater ination
and a contractionary response of the interest rate. For example, the more
people believe that government policy is e¤ective (the greater a^), the more
they think it will be inationary, and the smaller the Keynesian multiplier
given a: For the same reason, the more people believe the output/ination
trade-o¤ is unfavorable (the smaller ^), the smaller dy
dg
: Second, the Keynesian
multiplier is not identied, because g is endogenous and always proportional
5In Saint-Paul (2011), I discuss how parameter manipulation can be a way for a "benev-
olent" economist to provide the government with a commitment device.
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to z: If there was a random, exogenous component to g; and if that com-
ponent were observable, it would make it possible to identify the Keynesian
multiplier. That is, the vector space spanned by g and z would be of dimen-
sion 2 instead of 1. Here, though, people cannot disentangle the sensitivity of
output to government spending from the direct e¤ect of demand shocks. Sim-
ilar considerations arise in Sargent (2008) and Fudenberg and Levine (2003,
2007). This underidentication would still hold in richer models provided
that the number of parameters is large enough relative to the dimension of
the observables space.
The government uses the perceived model to compute the Keynesian mul-
tiplier. To get the perceived multiplier, one just has to replace a and b with
a^ and b^; respectively, in (7), getting
d^y
d^g
=
a^(^   ^)
^ + b^  ^ : (8)
To compute g; we can compute E^(y j z) by applying hatted expectations
to (4), yielding
E^(y j z) = a^(^   ^)
^ + b^  ^g +
^   ^
^ + b^  ^ E^(u j z): (9)
By Bayeslaw, we have
E^(u j z) = !^^
2
u
!^^2u + ^
2
"
z:
As will be shown below, autocoherence implies that
1 = Ez2 = E^z2
= !22u + 
2
"
= !^2^2u + ^
2
":
For simplicity I will make use of this right away. Then
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E^(u j z) = !^^2uz: (10)
Substituting (10),(9), and (8) into (6), we eventually get
g = z;
where
 =  a^ (^   ^)
2
'

^ + b^  ^
2
+ a^2

^   ^
2 !^^2u < 0: (11)
Inspection of this formula reveals that government activism is larger, i.e.
jj is larger,
 The more people believe in a favorable "long-term" Phillips curve, i.e.
the greater ^   ^
 The more they believe the interest response of aggregate demand is
low, i.e. the smaller b^
As for the e¤ect of the perceived IKM a^; there is an "income e¤ect" and
a"substitution" e¤ect, implying that  is not monotonic in a^: For small values
of a^; the substitution e¤ect dominates; a more e¢ cient scal policy generates
greater activism. For large values of a^; though, the income e¤ect dominates:
the government takes advantage of an increase in a^ to reduce its activism,
since that increase has a direct favorable impact of the degree of stabilization
which is being achieved.
3.3 The reduced form model
The preceding subsection allows to compute the variables of interest p and
y as a function of the realization of the shocks u; v and ": This solution de-
termines the reduced form model, which is summarized in Table 1. Then,
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by replacing non hatted parameters (other than ) by their hatted counter-
parts, one can compute the reduced form perceived model, which is reported
in Table 2. These expressions introduce composite coe¢ cients that capture
the response of output and prices to the demand shock u and the error ":
For example, the coe¢ cient of u on y;
ayu =   b
^ + b^  ^!!^^
2
u + !(a 
a^b
^ + b^  ^) + 1; (12)
has three components. The constant 1 captures the direct e¤ect of the aggre-
gate demand shock on output. The term !(a  a^b
^+b^ ^) is typically negative
and captures the stabilizing e¤ect of scal policy. In it, a captures the direct
e¤ect of scal policy, and   a^b
^+b^ ^ captures the dissipation due to the e¤ect
of scal policy on price expectations: A scal expansion boosts expectations
of ination, which in turn increases actual ination and interest rates, which
in turn reduces the e¢ ciency of the expansion6. This reaction is stronger,
the greater the perceived e¤ect of scal policy on output (a^), the greater the
actual e¤ect of interest rates on output (b), and the more "unfavorable" the
perceived Phillips curve (the greater ^ and the smaller ^). Finally, the term
  b
^+b^ ^!!^^
2
u is the e¤ect of the direct reaction of price expectations to the
signal about the demand shock. Since this e¤ect would not exist absent a
reaction of interest rates to ination, we will label it the "monetary compo-
nent" of the reaction of output to demand shocks. It is also negative, since
that e¤ect tends to dampen demand shocks.
6If people think that scal policy is much more e¢ cient than it actually is, i.e. if a^ is
large, then the scal term becomes positive, implying that scal expansions are contrac-
tionary because of their (excessive) adverse e¤ect on ination expectations.
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Observable Expression
Output y = ayuu+ ay""+ v
Price p = apuu+ ap""+
 1

v
Coe¢ cients Expression
ayu   b^+b^ ^!!^^
2
u + !(a  a^b^+b^ ^) + 1
ay"   b^+b^ ^ !^^
2
u + (a  a^b^+b^ ^)
apu
 b
(^+b^ ^)!!^^
2
u + !

a

+ a^( b)
(^+b^ ^)

+ 1

ap"
 b
(^+b^ ^) !^^
2
u +

a

+ a^( b)
(^+b^ ^)


Table 1 The correct reduced form model
Observable Expression
Output y = a^yuu^+ a^y""^+ ^v^
Price p = a^puu^+ a^p""^+
^ 1
^
v
Coe¢ cients Expression
a^yu   b^^+b^ ^ !^
2^2u + !^
a^(^ ^)
^+b^ ^ + 1
a^y"   b^^+b^ ^ !^^
2
u + 
a^(^ ^)
^+b^ ^
a^pu
^ b^
^(^+b^ ^) !^
2^2u +
a^
^+b^ ^ !^ +
1
^
a^p"
^ b^
^(^+b^ ^) !^^
2
u +
a^
^+b^ ^
Table 2 The perceived reduced form model
4 Autocoherence conditions
The reduced form models can then be used to derive the autocoherence con-
ditions. The perceived model must correctly predict the joint distribution
of the observables. As all variables are Gaussian and it is common knowl-
edge that their mean is zero, the autocoherence property requires that the
variance-covariance matrix of (y; p; z)0 computed using that perceived model
matches the actual one. This determines six independent autocoherence
conditions that are derived in the Appendix (equations (22)-(27)). There
are nine parameters: (a^; b^; ^; ^2u; ^; ^; ^
2
v; !^; ^
2
") and therefore three degrees of
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freedom.
Since the joint distribution of p and z is observed, the autocoherence
conditions always imply that E^(p j z) = E(p j z): In other words, in equi-
librium expectations are rational in the usual sense7. If government policy
were xed, we could then solve for a unique rational expectations equilibrium
(REE) for model (1)-(2) in the usual way. All autocoherent models would
then be equivalent in that they deliver the same REE equilibrium8, leaving
no room for the economists to manipulate outcomes. However, government
policy does depend on the perceived model, because to set its optimal policy
the government must know structural parameters (in particular the multi-
plier a) that are not identied from the joint distribution of (p; y; z): This
opens the possibility for the expert to manipulate government policy.
However, not all parameters can be used to manipulate policy. The au-
tocoherence conditions imply that the parameters of the Phillips curve are
useless for pursuing an agenda.
Proposition 1  The autocoherence conditions imply
^   ^ =    :
Proof See Appendix.
7Algebraically, we have that E(p j z) = apuE(u j z) + ap"E(u j z)
= (apu!
2
u +ap"
2
")z: Similarly, E^(p j z) = (a^pu!^^2u + a^p"^2")z: Therefore, the condition
E(u j z) = E^(u j z) is equivalent to apu!2u + ap"2" = a^pu!^^2u + a^p"^2"; i.e. autocoherence
condition (AC3) in the appendix.
8Again, this can be checked algebraically. Note that !
2
u
 + ap" =
!2u
 +
a
 +
 b

h
!^^2u+a^
^+b^ ^
i
and that !^^
2
u
^
+ a^p" =
!^^2u+a^
^+b^ ^ : Therefore, condition (24) is equivalent to
!^^2u+a^
^+b^ ^ =
!2u+a
+b  : Next, note that all the hatted terms in ap"; apu; ay" and ayu can be
grouped in the ratio !^^
2
u+a^
^+b^ ^ : Since that ratio must be equal to
!2u+a
+b  ; if  is exogenous,
none of those coe¢ cients depend on the perceived model. Consequently, the equilibrium
is unique and must be identical to the REE equilibrium.
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Corollary Given a^; and b^;  is independent of the choice of ^ and ^; and
so is the equilibrium.
Proof Immediate from (11).
The policymaker cares about the ultimate e¤ect of output of government
spending, which only depends on price formation through the di¤erence be-
tween the output response to prices  and its (adverse) response to price
expectations : But to match the covariances between output and the de-
mand signal and prices and the demand signal, the economist is forced to
reveal this di¤erence. Thus given a^ and b^; he cannot inuence policy through
the design of the price block of his model.9 Intuitively, this is because the
demand signal z, which is not polluted by the supply shock, acts as an instru-
mental variable allowing agents to infer     from cov(y; z) and cov(p; z);
two empirical moments that must be correctly predicted by the perceived
model.
Since there is little room for the perceived Phillips curve to be used by ex-
pert to inuence outcomes, in what follows I will assume that  and therefore
 are known. In the subsequent section I will discuss a case where Propo-
sition 1 does not hold and policy can be inuenced through the perceived
Phillips curve parameters.
5 The price block is revealed
In this section I assume  and  are known. Furthermore, to simplify the
analysis, I will also assume that ! and u are known. Note that the only way
for the expert to a¤ect the perceived values of a and b is then through the
9Remember, though, that a^ and b^ are themselves composite parameters and their ex-
pression depends on ^ and ^. While given ^ and ^; any target for those parameters can be
reached by picking the appropriate ^ and ^; if for example  is known it may be necessary
to choose a particular value of ^ to get the desired value of a^:
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perceived underlying demand Keynesian multiplier and interest elasticity of
aggregate demand. For the sake of simplicity, in the following discussion I
will assimilate a change in a^ with a change in ^ in the same direction, and
similarly for b^ and ^:
5.1 Simplifying the autocoherence conditions
Under our assumptions, it must be that !^ = !; ^u = u; ^ = ; and  = ^:
It is then shown in the Appendix that in such a case, autocoherence implies
that the perceived reduced form model must match the correct reduced form
model, that is:
ay" = a^y";
ayu = a^yu;
ap" = a^p";
apu = a^pu;
 = ^:
Nevertheless, because the correct reduced form coe¢ cients themselves de-
pend on beliefs, through the government policy parameter ; it does not
follow that the perceived structural model should be the same as the correct
one. And which perceived model is picked matters, because di¤erent per-
ceived models will lead to di¤erent stabilization policies and thus di¤erent
outcomes.
5.2 The trade-o¤between the scal and monetary out-
put responses
Experts are left with only one degree of freedom in designing their model,
which is captured by a trade-o¤ between a^ and b^; the perceived e¤ects on
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output of government spending and price expectations10. This trade-o¤ is
dened by the following formulae:
(b^  b)!2u = 
h
(a^  a)(   ) + a^b  ab^
i
; (13)
 =  a^ (   )
2
'

 + b^  
2
+ a^2 (   )2
!2u: (14)
Eliminating  between these two yields a cubic equation for b^; as a func-
tion of a^; which can be solved analytically, although numerical analysis is
necessary to nd out how b^ varies with a^ and the other parameters. When-
ever there are three values of b^ that solve this equation, the largest root was
selected. Given the requirement that b^ > 0; if that largest root is negative,
then there is no plausible autocoherent model for this value of a^:
But much can be learned by considering the following approximation.
Assume this is a "quasi-Lucas" economy, that is,     << 1: Then (14) is
equivalent to
   a^(   )
2
'b^2
!2u (15)
and substituting it into (13) we get
b^  b  a^(a^  a)
'b
(   )2: (16)
This trade-o¤ has the following properties
10This degree of freedom comes from the fact that in this special case, one autocoherence
condition becomes redundant. Thus one degree of freedom is left despite that the number
of free parameters has been reduced to the number of autocoherence conditions.
Why is one autocoherence condition redundant here? Basically, if one only imposes
that !^ = !; ^u = u; one can derive a condition involving ^ of which  is a solution,
although other values may also be solution in principle. Thus the condition ^ =  is almost
endogenously derived from !^ = !; ^u = u: Imposing it rules out some other values of ^
but is redundant as long as  is selected as the solution to the nonlinear equation which
determines ^:
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 (b^ b)(a^ a) < 0 and for a^ > a=2; db^=da^ < 0: Thus, the more the econo-
mist claims that government spending has a large impact on output,
the lower the theoretical impact of interest rates. The only exception
is if a^ is very low compared to a:
 The trade-o¤ is atter, the smaller  ; the greater ' and the greater
b: That is, the more the government is averse to stabilization, the less
favorable the Phillips curve, and the greater the true impact of interest
rates, the more the theoretical e¤ect of interest rates must be close
to the actual one, and the more arbitrary the theoretical impact of
government spending.
5.3 Interpreting the autocoherence trade-o¤
How can we make sense of these e¤ects? In order to understand them we can
focus on how a^ and b^ a¤ect outputs reaction to demand shocks, as captured
by the value of ayu and its perceived counterpart
a^yu =   b^
^ + b^  ^ !^
2^2u + !^
a^(^   ^)
^ + b^  ^ + 1:
As stated above, autocoherence implies that the perceived model must
correctly predict this elasticity. Furthermore, we also know that because of
rational expectations this correct value only depends on the perceived model
through the policy parameter : Consider an increase in a^ and hold  con-
stant (the e¤ect of the change in  is more complex and discussed in Remark
1 below). Then the equilibrium is unchanged and so is the output response
ayu. On the other hand, people will believe that ayu has fallen, since they
think that the direct expansionary e¤ect of scal policy (which outweighs its
indirect contractionary e¤ect through ination expectations) is now stronger.
This is captured by the scal component in a^yu; !^
a^(^ ^)
^+b^ ^ ; which, since ^ < ^
and  < 0; clearly falls in algebraic value as a^ goes up. This discrepancy
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would invalidate the model empirically unless b^ is changed so as to restore
the equality between the actual and perceived elasticity of output to demand
shocks. The dominant e¤ect of a reduction in b^ (in a quasi-Lucas economy) is
to increase the algebraic value of the perceived monetary component of a^yu;
given by   b^
^+b^ ^ !^
2^2u:
11 The lower b^; the lower the perceived output response
to interest rates, and the lower the perceived stabilizing e¤ect of monetary re-
actions to demand shocks: This e¤ect raises the perceived response of output
to demand shocks, thus restoring the models autocoherence. This explains
why there is a negative trade-o¤ between a^ and b^: Since b^ is the interest elas-
ticity of output, this means that experts face a trade-o¤ between believing
in scal policy e¤ectiveness versus believing in monetary policy e¤ectiveness.
An economist who would underpredict both elasticities would also underpre-
dict output volatility and could not empirically validate his model.
Remark 1: An increase in a^ also increases ; the degree of scal activism.
This magnies the discrepancy between the perceived and actual scal com-
ponents of ayubecause government expenditures are more reactive to the
demand shock signal: This discrepancy is negative if a^ > a; i.e. people ex-
pect more scal stabilization than actually happens. In this case, the increase
in  further widens the gap between actual and perceived scal components,
thus reinforcing the negative required response of b^ to the increase in a^: On
the other hand, if a^ < a; the discrepancy is positive: people expect greater
volatility of output coming from the scal component than in reality. While
the direct e¤ect of a greater a^ tends to make this discrepancy less positive,
the indirect e¤ect on  which magnies the di¤erence tends to make it larger.
For a^ < a=2 this e¤ect dominates, which explains why db^=da^ > 0 in this zone.
The size of the e¤ects I just discussed is proportional to jj ; the degree of
scal activism. The lower jj ; the lower the discrepancy between the actual
11 b^, also appears in the scal component but in a quasi-lucas economy this contribution
is very small since that component is proportional to (^   ^)3:
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and perceived scal components and the less reactive this discrepancy will be
to an increase in a^: Thus, the less scal policy is active, the lower the deviation
between b and b^ that must be implemented to compensate a given deviation
between a and a^: In the limit case where  = 0; there is no variation is scal
policy that would allow to identify a; and the only unidentied parameter
that a¤ects the output elasticity to demand shock is b; through the monetary
component. Thus, in that limit case, b^ = b and a^ is arbitrary. In turn, scal
activism is greater, the more favorable the output-ination trade-o¤ the
larger     and the smaller the welfare cost ' of scal volatility. This
explains why the trade-o¤ is atter, the smaller     and the greater ':
Remark 2: E¤ect of b: The equilibrium output response ayu falls more
with a^; the greater b: This is because the greater b; the greater the stabilizing
e¤ects of the monetary response to ination. This reduces the reduction in b^
that is needed to o¤set an increase in a^; since the correct output response to
demand shock that one has to match is now lower. Consequently, a greater
value of b makes the trade-o¤ between a^ and b^ atter.
Figure 1 depicts numerical simulations of the actual trade-o¤ for four
di¤erent sets of the parameters a and     (Note that the trade-o¤ only
depends on  and  through the di¤erence  ):12 The results are very similar
to what the above discussion based on the quasi-Lucas economy suggests.
For a^ > a=2 the trade-o¤ is decreasing and concave. It stops at a maximum
value of a^ beyond which the plausibility condition b^ > 0 is violated. In most
cases this corresponds to a catastrophe, mathematically speaking, in that the
number of roots of the cubic equation dening b^ falls from 3 to 1 in such a
way that the two largest roots disappear. Because of this discontinuity, the
12The other parameters in Figures 1 and 2 are b = 0:5; ' = 0:8; ! = 1; 2u = 0:1; 
2
v =
0:5:
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curves on Figure 1 stop before hitting the horizontal axis. As in the quasi-
Lucas case, it is atter, the less favorable the Phillips curve, i.e. the smaller
   : Furthermore, it shifts up and its slope becomes larger algebraically
when a; the actual Keynesian multiplier, goes up, which is also implied by
(16).
5.4 The optimal model
Which model will the expert select? As in Saint-Paul (2011), I assume his
objective is W = min E^(y2 + 'g2): In equilibrium, this is equal to (ignoring
constants that are independent of the perceived model)
W = a2yu
2
u + a
2
y"
2
" + '
2: (17)
Since the reduced form elasticities ayu and ay" only depend on the per-
ceived model through ; as long as the point chosen on the (a^; b^) trade-o¤
is interior, the corresponding value of  is the one that would be obtained
by directly maximizing W with respect to : In other words, unless plau-
sibility constraints force him into an corner solution, the intellectual is a
quasi-dictator, meaning that his preferred value of  is the one that would
prevail if the intellectual were setting policy using the right model:13
 =  =  a (   )
2
' ( + b  )2 + a2 (   )2!
2
u: (18)
This equality allows us to nd out how the perceived model depends on
the economists preferences. From this equality we have
da^
d'
=
@=@'
@=@a^+ @=@b^:db^=da^
;
13This can again be checked algebraically. The crucial autocoherence condition
!^^2u+a^
^+b^ ^ =
!2u+a
+b  implies that ayu =
!a( )
+b  +1  b!
22u
+b  and that ay" =
a( )
+b    b!
2
u
+b  :
Substituting these expressions into (17) and deriving the rst-order conditions with respect
to  delivers (18).
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where the derivative db^=da^ is taken along the autocoherence trade-o¤ be-
tween b^ and a^: We know that @=@b^ > 0; @=@' > 0; and @=@a^ < 0 if
the substitution e¤ect dominates. Then, in the normalpart of the trade-o¤
where db^=da^ < 0; we have that da^
d'
< 0: More conservative economists will
understate the impact of public expenditures and accordingly, to remain au-
tocoherent, overstate that of interest rates. Furthermore, if the economists
preferences are aligned with that of the government, then the correct model
is revealed, since by using it the government will then select  = : Since
autocoherence imposes rational ination expectations, there is no scope for
manipulating the public and an economist aligned with the government can-
not do better than reveal the truth.
Table 3 presents numerical simulations for various values of '; the degree
of conservatism of the economist (the parameter values are the same as in
Figure 1 and in particular b = 0:5). It conrms that the more conservative
the economist, the lower his theoretical IKM a^; and the larger the inter-
est elasticity of output b^: Note also that a corner solution prevails for very
progressive economists: the largest plausible value of a is selected.
' a = 0:2;     = 0:4 a = 0:2;     = 0:1
a^ b^ a^ b^
0:08 1:1 0:117 1:78 0:43
0:4 0:39 0:48 0:34 0:498
0:8 = ' 0:2 0:5 0:2 0:5
1:2 0:13 0:502 0:13 0:5
1:6 0:1 0:502 0:1 0:5
a = 0:8;     = 0:4 a = 0:8;     = 0:1
a^ b^ a^ b^
1:48 0:08 3:11 0:21
1:29 0:33 1:53 0:48
0:8 0:5 0:8 0:5
0:55 0:53 0:54 0:502
0:42 0:534 0:4 0:503
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Table 3 Ideological preferences and the experts preferred perceived model.*
= maximum possible value.
6 Manipulation of the Phillips curve parame-
ters
While economistsopinions about the Keynesian multiplier di¤er, so is the
case with the parameters of the Phillips curve. But in the preceding model,
these parameters cannot be manipulated in a way that matters for policy.14
I now study an example where the signal z upon which forecasts are based
does not allow to identify the slope of the Phillips curve    : That is, I
assume that z is now an aggregate of the demand and supply shock:
z = !u  v:
Again I assume ; ! > 0: The signal z is interpreted as a signal about
the aggregate price level. Thus this signal goes up with demand shocks but
down with supply shocks. Furthermore, as the signal is polluted by the
supply shock, it is no longer a valid instrument for estimating    : This
quantity can no longer be inferred from the observed moments, and therefore
autocoherence no longer compels the expert to reveal it.
I impose the following normalization:
E(z2) = !22u + 
22v = 1:
To solve the model we now note that15 E^(u j z) = !^^2uz and E^(v j
z) =  ^^2vz: Performing the same steps as in section 3.1 and using those
14Again that is not exactly true because a and b depend on ; so that the economist
could distort  in addition to  and  to target a^ and b^; despite that this extra degree of
freedom is not needed.
15This again anticipates on the autocoherence condition E(z2) = E^(z2) = 1:
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expressions, we get that
pe =
a^
^ + b^  ^g + c^z;
with
c^ =
!^^2u   ^(^  1)^2v
^ + b^  ^ :
Therefore the solution is
y = u+ v   bc^z +

a  ba^
^ + b^  ^

g (19)
p =
  b

c^z +
 
a

+
a^(  b)
(^ + b^  ^)
!
g +
u

+
  1

v:
How is government policy determined in this variant of the model? Con-
ditions (7) and (8) as well as the FOC (6) still hold. But applying hatted
expectations to both sides of (19) we now get
E^(y j z) = a^(^   ^)
^ + b^  ^g +
"
!^^2u
^   ^
^ + b^  ^   ^^
2
v
 
^  (^  1)b^
^ + b^  ^
!#
z:
Consequently optimal scal policy is now given by g = z; with
 = a^
^^2v

^

^   ^
2
+ b^

^   ^

  (^   ^)2!^^2u
'

^ + b^  ^
2
+ a^2

^   ^
2 7 0: (20)
Note that the sign of  depends on the relative importance of supply and
demand shocks. If supply shocks are perceived to be more important (^2v
large enough relative to ^2u), an indication of price pressure (z > 0) signals a
contraction and will be met with expansionary policies ( > 0).16
16Clearly, this could change if a price stability objective were added to the governments
utility function.
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The models new solution is now given in Tables 4 and 5.
Observable Expression
Output y = ayuu+ ayvv
Price p = apuu+ apvv
Coe¢ cients Expression
ayu 1  b!c^+ !(a  a^b^+b^ ^)
ayv + bc^  (a  a^b^+b^ ^)
apu !

a

+ a^( b)
(^+b^ ^)

+ (  b)!c^

+ 1

apv
 1

  (  b)c^

  

a

+ a^( b)
(^+b^ ^)

:
Table 4 The correct reduced form model, Variant B
Observable Expression
Output y = a^yuu^+ a^yvv^
Price p = a^puu^+ a^pvv^
Coe¢ cients Expression
a^yu 1  b^!^c^+ !^ a^(^ ^)^+b^ ^
ayv ^+ b^^c^  ^ a^(^ ^)^+b^ ^
apu !^
a^
^+b^ ^ + (^  b^) !^c^^ + 1^
apv
^ 1
^
  (^  b^) ^c^
^
  ^ a^
^+b^ ^ :
Table 5 The perceived reduced form model, Variant B
There are again six autocoherence solutions and nine parameters. In con-
trast to the previous section, I will now assume that the key parameters of
the output block are common knowledge: a^ = a and b^ = b: The autoco-
herence conditions now leave us with one degree of freedom: they dene a
1-dimensional manifold in a 7-dimensional space. Rather than solving those
highly nonlinear equations, I linearize the system of autocoherence condi-
tions locally around the correct model. For such "quasi-correct" models,
the autocoherence conditions are thus a straight line in that space. Dene
^ = ^   << 1 and similarly for other parameters. Then we can reexpress
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the AC conditions in the following fashion
v = ^:q;
where v = ((^  ^);^;^v;!^;^u;^)0 and q is a 6-dimensional vector
whose ith coe¢ cient gives us the slope of the trade-o¤ between ^ and the ith
parameter in v:17 Of special interest is the rst coe¢ cient of q since it denes
the set of slope parameters of the long-run Phillips curve that the economist
may promote to inuence policy while remaining autocoherent.
The algebraic steps to derive the q vector are described in the Appendix,
and these formulas can be used to numerically compute q in a given economy.
Which point is going to be selected by the economist along this autoco-
herence locus? Again, he will be a quasi-dictator and it is natural, given our
approximation, to assume that his preferences di¤er only marginally from
those of the government: ' = ' + '; ' << 1: Let 0 be the value of
 prevailing if the perceived model is correct, then the target value of  for
the economist is given by ~  0 + @@'' = 0 + ~: On the other hand,
the value of  pursued by the government given the perceived model can be
expressed as   0 + (Ov) :v = 0 + ; where rv is the appropriate
vectors of derivatives18. They and @
@'
are computed in the Appendix. The
economist will pick the model that satises  = ~; implying that the
perceived model can be summarized by a relationship between ^ and ' :
^ = m';
where
m =
@
@'
(Ov) :q
: (21)
17Given the particular importance of the parameter    ; I prefer to use ^   ^ rather
than ^:
18There is no contribution of ^ in the di¤erentiation  with respect to the perceived
parameters once one also di¤erentiates with respect to the parameters in v; since ^ only
appears through ^   ^:
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I will now use those results to analyze the structure of the perceived model
and how it depends on the underlying parameters of the economy. In order
to organize the discussion, I will focus on ve intuitive characteristics of a
theory:
1. The short-term inationary cost of output (STC). This is equal to 1=^:
2. The long-term inationary cost of output (LTC), equal to 1=(^   ^):
3. The relative importance of supply shocks (RIS), equal to ^
2
v
^2u
:
4. The supply-intensity of the price indicator (SIP), equal to ^
2
^2v:
5. The share of output uctuations explained by supply shocks (SSO);
given by
a^2yv^
2
v
a^2yv^
2
v+a^
2
yu^
2
u
:
For each of these parameters, its ideological sensitivity is dened as its
derivative with respect to ': A positive ideological sensitivity means that the
parameter goes up, the more conservative the economist. The greater the
absolute value of ideological sensitivity, the more the parameter will deviate
from its true value as a result of the economists own agenda (and, intuitively,
we expect economists with di¤erent ideological positions to disagree more
about that parameter). The expressions for the ideological sensitivities are
given by the following Table.
Parameter Ideological sensitivity
STC  m=2
LTC  mq1=(   )2
RIS 2v
2u
m(q3   vu q5)
SIP 2m(2vq2 + 
2vq3)
SSO See Appendix
Table 6 Ideological sensitivities of key perceived parameters
Figures 4 to 9 report ideological sensitivities, as  varies, for 5 sets of
values for the other parameters. We observe the following:
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 Typically, the ideological sensitivity of LTC is positive: more conserv-
ative economists will report a higher inationary cost of output in the
long run. This makes sense as it will deter activist stabilization poli-
cies. However, there are exceptions: on Figure 9 where b is quite low
(b=0.1); LTC has a positive sensitivity only if  is large enough, i.e.
on the right of the asymptote.
 However, for other parameters, things are less clear-cut. For example,
the STC is always negative except on Figure 9. A conservative econo-
mist wants to downplay the e¢ ciency of stabilization through public
expenditures, but cannot act on all margins simultaneously because he
is bound by the autocoherence conditions. This sometimes forces him
to appear progressive on some fronts, as is the case for the short-term
inationary e¤ects of ination.
 Nevertheless, a pattern emerges: the ideological sensitivity of STC is
always small, implying that the truth is almost revealed about  re-
gardless of the economists ideological position, while there is much
more ideological polarization with respect to the value of : A conserv-
ative economist will overemphasize the negative impact of inationary
expectations on output, in a way reminiscent of Friedman (1968) and
Lucas (1972, 1973), while the left-wing economist will produce models
that understate ; in a fashion not unlike that of Akerlof, Dickens and
Perry (2000).
 We also note that in many simulations the share of output uctuations
explained by supply shocks has a positive ideological sensitivity con-
servative economists will predict that supply shocks play a bigger role
in output uctuations; however this does not happen because of the
RIS, which tends to have a negative sensitivity, but through the per-
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ceived responses of output to these shocks a^yu and a^yv: An exception
arises when u is very large (Figure 5), or b very low (Figure 9). In
Figure 9, the conservative economist believes in a mildly more favor-
able Phillips curve for  low, but also promotes the view that supply
shocks are relatively important. If  is high, the pattern is similar to
the other gures.
 An economy can be "critical", meaning that the denominator of (21)
is close to zero. This happens on Figure 9 around   0:59; and on
Figure 5 around  = 0:66: In a critical economy, parameters happen to
be such that ideology is uninuential. To compensate for that and act
as quasi-dictators, economists will tend to pick very large deviations
between the perceived and actual parameters: ideological sensitivities
become very large, as captured by the asymptotes in our gures. This
in fact means that our approximation is no longer valid; still small ideo-
logical deviations have large e¤ects on the prevailing view of the world.
Intuitively, an economy is critical if parameter values are such that the
autocoherence locus (a manifold in the perceived parameters space) is
included in an iso-policy locus. Here, this is true locally: the vector
q; which tells us the direction where the perceived model must move
to remain autocoherent, is orthogonal to the policy gradient Ov, and
therefore autocoherence implies local policy invariance. Note, however,
that the result that ideological deviations become large around a criti-
cal economy would be overturned if there was some convex cost to the
expert of deviating from the truth; economists would then no longer be
quasi-dictators and in a critical economy, the benets of manipulation
would be negligible relative to the costs of deviating from the truth.
Instead of becoming innite, ideological sensitivities would then fall to
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zero in a critical economy19.
7 Conclusion
Admittedly the present model does not have tight empirical predictions. The
equilibrium perceived model that one expects is highly dependent on the cor-
rect model, the set of variables that are observable, and the set of parameters
that are common knowledge. Nevertheless, this framework allows to iden-
tify the set of "credible" model parameters and to give some insight about
how political preferences will a¤ect the choice of those parameters. In par-
ticular, key parameters will be self-serving in the "expected" way, but this
typically implies that concessions have to be made with respect to the other
parameters. The analysis has also elicited the phenomenon of criticality, i.e.
economies where ideologies are ine¤ective, and for that reason tend to be
exacerbated.
19This can be seen by looking at the following reduced form optimization problem:
min^ c(^ )2+(s^ ')2; where  is the true parameter value, ^ the perceived one, s^ the
outcome (up to a constant), ' the target outcome, and c the cost of deviating from the
truth. The optimal value of ^ is c+s'c+s2 ; with a radically di¤erent behavior around s = 0
(criticality) depending on whether c is positive vs. zero.
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8 APPENDIX
8.1 Derivation of the autocoherence conditions
1. Variance of z
Ez2 = 1
= !22u + 
2
"
= E^z2
= !^2^2u + ^
2
": (22)
2. Covariance between z and y
Eyz = ayu!
2
u + ay"
2
"
= E^yz
= a^yu!^^
2
u + a^y"^
2
"
Using (22), (23) can be rewritten
(ay"! + 1)!
2
u + ay"(1  !22u) = (a^y"!^ + 1)!^^2u + a^y"(1  !^2^2u);
()
!2u + ay" = !^^
2
u + a^y": (23)
3. Covariance between z and p
Epz = apu!
2
u + ap"
2
"
= E^pz
= a^pu!^^
2
u + a^p"^
2
":
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Using similar steps as above, we can see that this is equivalent to
!2u

+ ap" =
!^^2u
^
+ a^p": (24)
4. Covariance between y and p
Epy = ayuapu
2
u + ay"ap"
2
" +
(  1)

2v
= (ay"! + 1)(
1

+ !ap")
2
u + ay"ap"
2
" +
(  1)

2v
=

1

+ !ap" + ay"!

2u + ay"ap" +
(  1)

2v
= E^py
=

1
^
+ !^a^p" + a^y"!^

^2u + a^y"a^p" +
^(^  1)
^
^2v: (25)
5. Variance of y
Ey2 = a2yu
2
u + a
2
y"
2
" + 
22v
= (ay"! + 1)
22u + a
2
y"(1  !22") + 22v
= (1 + 2ay"!)
2
u + a
2
y" + 
22v
= E^y2
= (1 + 2a^y"!^)^
2
u + a^
2
y" + ^
2^2v: (26)
6. Variance of p:
Note that this autocoherence condition can always be matched by picking
the right value of ^2, regardless of the other parameters of the perceived
model. I write it for the record.
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Ep2 = a2pu
2
u + a
2
p"
2
" +
(  1)2
2
2v + 
2

= (
1
2
+
2ap"!

)2u + a
2
p" +
(  1)2
2
2v
= E^p2
= (
1
^
2 +
2a^p"!^
^
)^2u + a^
2
p" +
(^  1)2
^
2 ^
2
v: (27)
8.2 Proof of Proposition 1
As proved in footnote 8, we know that condition (24) is equivalent to
!^^2u + a^
^ + b^  ^ =
!2u + a
 + b   : (28)
Using the denition of ay" and a^y"; we can rewrite (23) as
!2u + a  b

!^^2u + a^
^ + b^  ^

= !^^2u + a^  b^

!^^2u + a^
^ + b^  ^

Replacing !^^2u + a^ with
!2u+a
+b  (^ + b^   ^) and rearranging, we indeed
get ^   ^ =    :
QED
8.3 The price block revealed case
Assume !^ = !; ^u = u; and ^ = . We know from Proposition 2 that ^ = .
From (22) we get
^2" = 
2
":
From (23) we get
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ay" = a^y"; (29)
Similarly, for (24) to hold we need
ap" = a^p": (30)
This in turn implies ayu = a^yu and apu = a^pu:
Finally, (25) and (26) yield
(  1)

2v =
^(^  1)
^
^2v;
^2^2v = 
22v
The solution to this system is
 = ^;
^2v = 
2
v:
From (28) we get
!2u(b^  b) = 
h
a^( + b  )  a(^ + b^  ^)
i
: (31)
Recall, from (11), that
 =  a^ (   )
2
'

 + b^  
2
+ a^2 (   )2
!2u: (32)
Substituting, we get the cubic equation that has been solved numerically:
(b^ b)

'

 + b^  
2
+ a^2 (   )2

+a^( )2
h
(a^  a)(   ) + a^b  ab^
i
= 0:
Finally, the above conditions trivially imply that the remaining condition
(27) holds.
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8.4 Linearization of the AC conditions in variant B
The six AC conditions are
1 = !^2^2u + ^
2
^2v; (33)
ayu!
2
u   ayv2v = a^yu!^^2u   a^yv^^2v; (34)
apu!
2
u   apv2v = a^pu!^^2u   a^pv^^2v; (35)
ayuapu
2
u + ayvapv
2
v = a^yua^pu^
2
u + a^yva^pv^
2
v; (36)
a2yu
2
u + a
2
yv
2
v = a^
2
yu^
2
u + a^
2
yv^
2
v; (37)
a2pu
2
u + a
2
pv
2
v = a^
2
pu^
2
u + a^
2
pv^
2
v: (38)
Using the denitions in Table 4 and 5 to rearrange (35), and dening c =
!2u ( 1)2v
+b  ; we see that (35) is equivalent to
c^+
a^
^ + b^  ^ = c+
a
 + b  : (39)
This expression can be conveniently substituted into the expressions in
Tables 4 and 5 to reduce the number of hatted parameters that appear. We
get the following:
Coe¢ cients Expression
ayu 1 + !a  b!(c+ a+b )
ayv   a+ b

c+ a
+b 

apu
1

+ (  b)!


c+ a
+b 

+ a!

apv
 1

  (  b)


c+ a
+b 

  a

a^yu 1 + !^a^  b^!^(c+ a+b )
a^yv ^  ^a^+ b^^

c+ a
+b 

a^pu
1
^
+ (^  b^) !^
^

c+ a
+b 

+ a^!^
^
a^pv
^ 1
^
  (^  b^) ^
^

c+ a
+b 

  a^^
^
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From now on we will take into account that a^ = a and b^ = b: Using this
Table we can then compute a^yu = a^yu   ayu; etc.20 We get
a^yu 

a(   )
 + b     bc

!^;
a^pu   ^
2

1 + (  b)!c+ a!
 + b  

+
^

!(c+
a
 + b  )
+
!^


(  b)c+ a
 + b  

;
a^yv  ^+ ^

bc  a(   )
 + b  

;
a^pv  ^

  ^
2

  1  (  b)c  a
 + b  

 ^

(c+
a
 + b  ) 
^


(  b)c+ a
 + b  

:
We can also compute
c^   !
2
u   (  1)2v
( + b  )2

^  ^

+
1
 + b  
h
2u!^ + 2!u^u   2v^  (  1)2v^  2(  1)v^v
i
:
Finally, substituting (39) into (34) and rearranging using the denitions
in Tables 4 and 5 we get the following:
c+
a
 + b  
h
^   ^   + 
i
= ^^2v   2v: (40)
Next, we di¤erentiate (33)-(38), substituting (39) and (40) for (35) and
(34) respectively, and replacing a^yu,etc.,as well as c^ by their expressions
above. We get six linear equations that are expressed as
20Note that a small deviation between the perceived and correct model changes  mar-
ginally, hence ayu is di¤erent from its value under the correct model, and thus a^yu is not
equal to the di¤erence between a^yu and the value of ayu under the correct model.
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A:((^   ^);^;^v;!^;^u;^)0 = ^:w;
where the nonzero coe¢ cients of A : 6 6, and w : 6 1 are the following:
A12 = 
2
v; A13 = 
2v; A14 = !
2
u; A15 = !
2u:
A21 = c+
a
+b  ; A22 =  2v; A23 =  2v:
A31 =  !2u ( 1)2v(+b )2   a(+b )2 ; A32 =  
( 1)2v
+b  ; A33 =  2( 1)v+b  ; A34 =
2u
+b  ; A35 =
2!u
+b  ; A36 =   
2
v
+b  :
A41 =

c+ a
+b 

ayv2v !ayu2u


;A42 = apv
2
v(bc a( )+b  ) ayv
2
v


(  b)c+ a
+b 

;
A43 = 2ayvapvv; A44 = apu
2
u(
a( )
+b    bc) + ayu
2
u


(  b)c+ a
+b 

;
A45 = 2ayuapuu; A46 = apv
2
v +
ayv

2v:
A52 = ayv
2
v(bc  a( )+b  ); A53 = a2yvv; A54 = ayu2u(a( )+b    bc); A55 =
a2yuu; A56 = ayv
2
v:
A61 =

c+ a
+b 

apv2v !apu2u


; A62 =  apv
2
v


(  b)c+ a
+b 

;
A63 = a
2
pvv; A64 =
apu2u


(  b)c+ a
+b 

; A65 = a
2
puu; A66 =
apv2v

:
w4 =
2uayu
2

1 + (  b)!c+ a!
+b 

+

c+ a
+b 

2vayv !2uayu


+
2
vayv
2

  1  (  b)c  a
+b 

;
w6 =
2uapu
2

1 + (  b)!c+ a!
+b 

+

c+ a
+b 

2vapv !2uapu


+
2
vapv
2

  1  (  b)c  a
+b 

:
In the above,  is computed at the correct model:  = 0: From there we
can compute q = A 1w:
To compute the coe¢ cient m in (21) we use (20) and note that
@
@'
=   ( + b  )
2
'( + b  )2 + a2(   )2
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and that
Ov = (
@
@(^   ^) ;
@
@^
;
@
@^v
;
@
@!^
;
@
@^u
;
@
@^
)0
=
a
'( + b  )2 + a2(   )2
0BBBBBB@
22v(   ) + b2v   2(   )!2u
2v ((   )2 + b(   ))
2v ((   )2 + b(   ))
 (   )22u
 2(   )2!u
(   )22v
1CCCCCCA
  
'( + b  )2 + a2(   )2
0BBBBBB@
(2'( + b  ) + 2a2(   ))
0
0
0
0
0
1CCCCCCA :
In particular, the above derivations imply the following expression for
SSO:
SSO =
2a2yu
2
u
2
vayv(mq6 +mq2(bc  a  +b )) + 2a2yu2uva2yvmq3
+2ayu
2
u
2
va
2
yvmq4(bc  a  +b ))  2a2yuu2va2yvmq5
(a2yv
2
v + a
2
yu
2
u)
2
:
40
00,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,
01
0,
08
0,
15
0,
22
0,
29
0,
36
0,
43 0,
5
0,
57
0,
64
0,
71
0,
78
0,
85
0,
92
0,
99
1,
06
1,
13 1,
2
1,
27
1,
34
1,
41
1,
48
1,
55
1,
62
1,
69
1,
76
1,
83 1,
9
1,
97
2,
04
2,
11
2,
18
2,
25
2,
32
2,
39
2,
46
2,
53 2,
6
2,
67
2,
74
2,
81
2,
88
2,
95
3,
02
3,
09
Figure 1 -- The a/b trade-off 
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Figure 2 -- The a/b trade-off, a=0.8
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Figure 3 -- Optimal models of left-wing economists, a=0.2 
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 Figure 4 – Ideological sensitivities,   a = 0.7 ; b = 0.5 ; ω = 1; λ=1; σu2
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 Figure 5 – Ideological sensitivities,   a = 0.7 ; b = 0.5 ; ω = 1; λ=1; σu2
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 Figure 6 – Ideological sensitivities,   a = 0.7 ; b = 0.5 ; ω = 1; λ=1; σu2
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 Figure 7 – Ideological sensitivities,   a = 1 ; b = 0.5 ; ω = 1; λ=1; σu2
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 Figure 8 – Ideological sensitivities,   a = 0.3 ; b = 0.5 ; ω = 1; λ=1; σu2
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 Figure 9 – Ideological sensitivities,   a = 0.7 ; b = 0.1 ; ω = 1; λ=1; σu2
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